Multiple delivery specications exist on nearly all commodity futures contracts. Sellers are typically allowed to choose among several grades of the underlying commodity. On the delivery day, the futures price converges to the spot price of the cheapest-to-deliver grade rather than to that of the par-delivery grade of the commodity. This imposes an additional delivery risk on hedgers. This paper derives the optimal production and futures hedging strategy for a risk-averse competitive rm in the presence of delivery risk. We show that, depending on its relative valuation, the delivery option may induce the rm to produce more than in the absence of delivery risk. If delivery risk is additively related to commodity price risk, the rm will under-hedge its exposure to commodity price risk. If delivery risk is multiplicatively related to commodity price risk, the rm will under-or over-hedge this exposure. For constant relative risk aversion, this is illustrated by a numerical example.
Introduction
Many commodity futures contracts possess options as to what, where, when and how much of the underlying the seller of the futures contract can deliver. These multiple delivery specications are known as the quality option, the location option, the timing option and the quantity option. They are embedded in futures contracts in order to constrain the severity of market manipulation such as squeezes and corners. 1 This paper concentrates on the optimal production and futures hedging decision of a commodity producer in the presence of a quality option.
2 If the seller of 1 Pirrong (1993) derives necessary and sucient conditions for manipulating futures prices at contract expiry. Pirrong (2001) compares the probability of market manipulation for deliverysettled with that for cash-settled futures contracts.
2 If a commodity at dierent locations is interpreted as dierent grades of the commodity, there is no dierence between location options and quality options. For location options, see Garbade and Silber (1983a) and Pirrong, Kormendi and Meguire (1994) . Financial futures contracts with delivery options are analyzed by Manaster (1986, 1991) , Kane and Markus (1986) and Hemler (1990) . the futures contract exercises the quality option by deviating from the par-delivery grade, there will usually be a correction of the futures price that the seller receives.
Upward corrections are called premiums, downward correction are called discounts.
However, the realized price dierence between the par-delivery grade and a nonpar-delivery grade can deviate signicantly from the premium or discount of this non-par-delivery grade. Therefore, the seller can minimize his cost by delivering the cheapest-to-deliver grade. 3 It follows that the (corrected) futures price on the delivery day converges to the spot price of the cheapest-to-deliver grade rather than the spot price of the par-delivery grade. As shown by Kamara and Siegel (1987) , Lien (1988 Lien ( , 1991 and Viswanath and Chatterjee (1992) , delivery options have an impact on optimal futures positions provided that a signicant proportion of open interest in a futures contract is physically delivered. 4 5 In particular, hedgers are exposed to an additional delivery risk vis-à-vis the underlying price risk since it is uncertain which grade would be the cheapest to deliver. This delivery risk cannot be hedged such that hedging the price risk of the underlying is impaired by the delivery risk embedded in the futures contract. 6 As a consequence, the regression approach to nding the variance minimizing hedge ratio is no longer appropriate as shown by Kamara and Siegel (1987). 7 This paper analyzes the eect of the quality option embedded in commodity futures contracts on a producer's optimal production and futures hedging decision in a competitive environment. There are three main ndings: First, delivery risk 3 The cheapest-to-deliver grade is the grade with the minimum delivery-adjusted spot price among all deliverable grades.
4 Williams (1991, 1992) provide evidence for the signicance of physical delivery. They document that deliveries on the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) wheat, corn and soybean futures markets and the New York Commodity Exchange copper futures market are on average around 15% of the peak open interest in each delivery month in the 1970s and 1980s. On the delivery day, this gure is approximately 50%.
5 Lien (1988 Lien ( , 1991 analyzes the welfare eects of introducing a delivery option into an existing futures contract. Garbade and Silber (1983b) compare the welfare eects of physical delivery and cash settlement. 6 This was rst noted by Garbade and Silber (1983a) , but does not necessarily hold if there are options on the futures contract, see Lien and Wong (2002) , or dynamically complete markets.
7 However, Viswanath and Chatterjee (1992) show that the dierence is not economically signicant for the CBOT wheat contract between 1970 and 1981. The regression approach has been proposed by Zilcha (1983, 1984) , Lence (1995) and others. has a positive impact on output if the producer considers the delivery option more valuable than the market does. Second, we analyze risk management with futures contracts and show that the optimal hedge ratio is below one if the delivery risk embedded in a futures contract is independent of the level of spot prices at the delivery date. Third, if the amount of delivery risk increases with the level of spot prices, the optimal hedge ratio may also be above one despite the fact that futures hedging creates unhedgeable delivery risk.
The paper by Kamara and Siegel (1987) comes closest to ours. However, we extend their work in at least three respects: Firstly, Kamara and Siegel (1987) analyze the case of two deliverable grades with jointly normally distributed prices having equal variance whereas this paper captures the eect of any number of deliverable grades without relying on normality assumptions. Secondly, our model allows for more general preferences as compared to the mean-variance framework used by Kamara and Siegel (1987) . Finally, they take the initial exposure as given and focus on optimal hedging whereas this paper endogenizes the production decision. This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 delineates a single-period model of a risk-averse competitive rm facing both price risk and delivery risk. The impact of delivery risk on the optimal production decision is presented in Section 3. Optimal risk management with futures is analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.
The model
Consider a one-period model with two dates, indexed by t = 0 and 1. There is a commodity which has several grades, labeled as grades 1, 2, ..., n, where n ≥ 2. At t = 0, a risk-averse rm operating in a competitive environment produces grade 1 of the commodity according to a cost function C(Q) where Q is the rm's output level to be sold at t = 1; C(0) ≥ 0, C (Q) > 0 and C (Q) > 0. When making its production decision at t = 0, the rm neither knows the spot price of grade 1 of the commodity at t = 1, denotedP 1 , nor the spot prices of the other grades, denoted
The support ofP i is given by [P i , P i ] with 0 < P i < P i < ∞ for each i. SinceP 1 is random, the rm is exposed to commodity price risk.
At t = 0, the rm can trade innitely divisible futures contracts in a competitive futures market where contracts mature at t = 1. Let H denote the number of futures contracts sold (purchased if H is negative) by the rm. The futures price at t = 0, denoted F , is given.
At maturity at t = 1, sellers of the futures contracts have the right to choose among the deliverable grades 1, 2, ..., n of the commodity the grade they want to deliver for the fulllment of their obligations.
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Since sellers exercise this delivery option by choosing the cheapest-to-deliver grade, the futures price at t = 1 is equal to the minimum ofP 1 ,P 2 , ...,P n .
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Thus, there is an additional delivery risk vis-à-vis the price risk to which the rm is exposed should it enter into a non-trivial
The rm's prots at t = 1 are given by
(1)
The rm has a von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function U (Π), dened over its prots at t = 1, with U (Π) > 0 and U (Π) < 0, indicating risk aversion. The rm's decision problem at t = 0 is to choose an output level Q and a futures position H so as to maximize the expected utility of its prots at t = 1,
subject to equation (1), where E[·] is the expectation operator with respect to the (subjective) joint probability distribution ofP 1 ,P 2 , ...,P n .
8 Throughout the paper, random variables have a tilde ( ∼ ) while their realizations do not. 9 Location options embedded in a number of futures contracts can all be captured by the quality options of the type considered in this model. 10 For simplicity, it is assumed that there are no delivery adjustments in the form of premiums and discounts. Otherwise, the model had to be based on the delivery-adjusted prices of grades 2, 3, ..., n.
11 Production costs C(Q) are compounded to t = 1. Since transaction costs in the delivery process are neglected, there is no dierence between cash settlement and physical delivery.
The rst-order conditions for an optimum are given by
where an asterisk ( * ) indicates an optimal level. Given risk aversion and the convexity of the cost function, the second-order conditions for the unique maximum (Q * , H * ) are satised. The optimal output level is assumed to be positive, Q * > 0.
Optimal production under delivery risk
In this section, the rm's optimal production decision and its reaction to the introduction of delivery risk is examined. As a benchmark, we consider the hypothetical case in which only grade 1 of the commodity is deliverable. In this case, program (2) becomes max Qa,Ha
where index a indicates the absence of delivery options. In this case, the well-known separation and full-hedging theorems apply such that the rm's optimal output level Q * a solves C (Q * a ) = F a and the optimal futures position H * a is a full hedge,
12 Now, we return to the rm's decision problem in the presence of delivery risk. Equation (4) can be rewritten as
Substituting the above equation into equation (3) and rearranging terms yields
.
12 See Holthausen (1979) . 13 Notice that min(0, P 2 − P 1 , P 3 − P 1 , ..., P n − P 1 ) = − max(0, P 1 − P 2 , P 1 − P 3 , ..., P 1 − P n ).
V is positive since U (Π) > 0 and max(0, P 1 − P 2 , P 1 − P 3 , ..., P 1 − P n ) ≥ 0 with strict inequality in at least one state.
14 V represents the rm's individual valuation of the payo from the delivery option at t = 1, calculated at t = 0. Since marginal utility is evaluated at the optimum Π * , this valuation generally depends upon the rm's optimal decisions due to wealth eects etc.
The dierence between the futures price in the absence of a delivery option and the futures price in the presence of it, (F a − F ), can be interpreted as the market's valuation of the delivery option.
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Of course, this dierence is positive since it is the seller of the futures contract who has the right to exercise the option such that the futures price has to be reduced by the value of this option.
The reaction of the rm's optimal production decision to the introduction of delivery risk depends on the rm's individual valuation of the delivery option, V , relative to the value the market attaches to the delivery option as represented by
16
It is important to notice that assuming dierent valuations is not a problem in futures markets since the existence of futures contracts requires at least some heterogeneity among futures market participants. Given this heterogeneity, it is likely that dierent (groups of) market participants attach dierent values to the futures contract and to the delivery option.
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Therefore, the value attached to the delivery option in a futures market equilibrium, (F a − F ), generally diers from the 14 If this condition is violated such that max(0, P 1 − P 2 , P 1 − P 3 , ..., P 1 − P n ) = 0 in all states, grade 1 of the commodity is always the cheapest-to-deliver grade such that there is no delivery risk at all and, hence, V = 0.
15 It is not realistic to assume the coexistence of two futures contracts on the same commodity, one without delivery options, the other with such options. Hence, it would be somewhat misleading to call the dierence (F a − F ) a 'market value' in the usual sense since it is both impossible to observe this value as well as to trade the delivery option separately. 16 It is assumed that the distribution of the par-delivery grade's priceP 1 is not aected by the existence of the delivery option in the futures contract. 17 Since delivery options can be interpreted as options to exchange one grade for another, one can apply valuation models for exchange options such as that of Margrabe (1978) which is employed by Gay and Manaster (1984) for the valuation of the quality option in the case of two deliverable grades. A theoretical pricing model for any number of deliverable grades is presented by Boyle (1989) . An overview on pricing is provided by Chance and Hemler (1993) . Kamara (1990) demonstrates that the delivery structure has crucial implications for equilibrium pricing and, hence, market eciency tests even if delivery uncertainty is relatively small. rm's subjective valuation, V .
Subtracting equation (5) from the condition
The convexity of the cost function directly implies the following proposition.
Proposition 1 If the risk-averse competitive rm attaches a higher value to the delivery option than the market does, V > (F a − F ), introducing a delivery option induces the rm to raise its optimal level of production,
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is as follows: Notice rst that the rm can always sell the marginal unit of its output via the futures market at the predetermined futures price which is either F or F a . In the absence of delivery risk, the rm optimally produces at the point where the marginal cost of production equals the deterministic marginal revenue F a . In the presence of the delivery option, the rm receives the smaller futures price F . Taken in isolation, this decreases production
But by selling futures contracts, the rm also acquires the valuable delivery option. If protable at maturity at t = 1, the rm does not deliver its output of grade 1, but sells this output at the spot price P 1 and uses part of the proceeds to purchase the cheapest-to-deliver grade at the spot price min(P 2 , ..., P n ) in order to fulll the futures contracts. It thereby generates an additional marginal revenue of max(0, P 1 − P 2 , P 1 − P 3 , ..., P 1 − P n ). At t = 0, this additional marginal revenue is stochastic but never negative (as is the case for any rational option exercise policy). The rm's individual valuation of this uncertain marginal revenue (in the optimum) is given by V > 0. This additional marginal revenue increases production. In sum, the rm attaches a value of (F + V ) to its marginal revenue as indicated by equation (5).
The net eect of introducing a delivery option depends on the size of V relative to (F a − F ) > 0 which is the amount the rm has to pay for this option. If the increase in marginal revenue due to V is higher than the decrease due to (F a −F ), the optimal level of production is higher. If the reverse relation holds, optimal output is smaller. This is the statement of Proposition 1.
In addition, it follows directly from equation (5) and the denition of V that the rm's optimal production decision depends on its assessment of the joint probability distribution ofP 1 ,P 2 , ...,P n , and on its attitude towards risk. In other words, the separation theorem fails to hold when there is delivery risk. This is not surprising since there is no way to make the marginal revenue non-stochastic in the presence of non-tradable delivery risk.
Optimal futures hedging under delivery risk
In order to derive the optimal hedging position, it is necessary to impose some structure on the joint probability distribution ofP 1 ,P 2 , ...,P n . For tractability, we shall consider two alternative specications.
Assumption A The spot price of grade i (i = 2, 3, ..., n) of the commodity at t = 1 is related to that of grade 1 in the following additive manner:
whereε i is a zero-mean random variable with support [ε i , ε i ]. Apart from the assumption that ε i + P 1 > 0 in order to guarantee P i > 0 in all states,ε i andP 1 are independent.
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Assumption M The spot price of grade i (i = 2, 3, ..., n) of the commodity at t = 1 is related to that of grade 1 in the following multiplicative manner:
As will be shown below, the rm's optimal futures position depends on which of these two assumptions holds. In order to focus on the hedging role of futures 18 It is not necessary to assume that theε i s are independent of each other. 19 Again, theγ i s do not have to be independent of each other.
contracts, it is assumed that the futures market is unbiased under either assumption A or assumption M. That is, the futures price at t = 0 equals the expected futures price at t = 1 such that F = E[min(P 1 ,P 2 , ...,P n )].
For the ease of exposition, we reformulate the rm's decision problem by xing its output level at Q * . Let EU = E[U(Π)], whereΠ is dened in equation (1) with
. Partially dierentiating EU with respect to H yields
where the second equality follows from the unbiasedness assumption. The right-hand side of equation (6) Proof. Evaluating the right-hand side of equation (6) at H = 0 and using assumption A results in
where the second equality follows from the fact thatε i is independent ofP 1 for all i = 2, 3, ..., n.
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Since U (Π) < 0, the right-hand side of equation (7) is positive.
Thus, by the concavity of EU, we have H * > 0.
Now, evaluating the right-hand side of equation (6) sumption A yields
where the second equality follows from the fact thatε i is independent ofP 1 for all i = 2, 3, ..., n. Since U (Π) < 0, the right-hand side of equation (8) If the rm can use futures contracts to hedge against uctuations in the spot price of its output at t = 1, the unbiasedness of the futures market guarantees that this does not aect the rm's expected prots. Thus, any futures position taken by the rm only aects the rm's risk. Under assumption A, the futures contracts can be interpreted as a package of commodity price risk fromP 1 and delivery risk from min(0,ε 2 ,ε 3 , ...,ε n ). In particular, the additive combination of the two independent risks ensures that the amount of delivery risk embedded in each futures contract is invariant to dierent realizations ofP 1 .
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As a result, hedging against commodity price risk arising fromP 1 using futures contracts always generates the same exposure to delivery risk arising from min(0,ε 2 ,ε 3 , ...,ε n ), thereby rendering a clear conict between hedging against commodity price risk and creating delivery risk exposure.
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Complete elimination of commodity price risk calls for full hedging, H = Q * , whereas complete elimination of delivery risk calls for no hedging, H = 0. Since the two risks are independent, the rm cannot enter into a riskless position. Indeed, the rm's optimal futures position as stated in Proposition 2 is simply a compromise between full hedging and no hedging. The smaller the delivery risk relative to the commodity price risk, the more closely the optimal futures position approaches a full hedge. 21 In a similar spirit, the cross hedging model of Zilcha (1983, 1984 ) is based on the assumption that basis risk is independent of the level of spot prices (regression approach).
22 Alternatively put, the potential gain from exercising the delivery option is independent of P 1 . Now, we turn to the rm's optimal futures position under assumption M.
Proposition 3 Suppose that assumption M holds. If the futures market is unbiased, the rm's optimal futures position is a short position, H * > 0.
Proof. Evaluating the right-hand side of equation (6) at H = 0 and using assumption M, we have
where the second equality follows from the fact thatγ i is independent ofP 1 for all i = 2, 3, ..., n.
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Since U (Π) < 0, the right-hand side of equation (9) is positive.
Thus, by the concavity of EU, we have
Under assumption M, the conict between hedging against commodity price risk and creating delivery risk is less clear-cut if contrasted to the conict under assumption A. The multiplicative combination ofP 1 -risk andγ-risk from min(0,γ 2 ,γ 3 , ...,γ n ) that characterizes assumption M implies that the amount of delivery risk embedded in each futures contract is higher the higher the realization ofP 1 . In other words, the potential benet arising from the delivery option that is enjoyed by selling the futures contracts increases in P 1 . It is this uncertainty about the trade-o betweeñ P 1 -risk andγ-risk that is responsible for the lack of an unambiguous relationship between the optimal futures position and the optimal output level. Proposition 3 only states that the rm sells futures contracts, but it is completely silent about the optimality of under-or over-hedging.
However, one can derive a necessary and sucient condition for the optimality of under-or over-hedging. At full hedging, H = Q * , the rm's prots can be written as Evaluating the right-hand side of equation (6) 
To sign the rst covariance in (10), use the Law of Iterated Expectations to
(11) min(0,γ 2 , ...,γ n ) is non-positive in all states and strictly negative in at least one state. Since U (Π) < 0 and H = Q * > 0, the expression in (11) and, hence, the rst covariance in (10) is negative. For the same reason, the second covariance in (10) is positive. Thus, it is not possible to derive a general statement on whether the optimal futures position is an under-or an over-hedge. However, a necessary and sucient condition for an under-hedge [over-hedge] is that the rst covariance is smaller [larger] than the second covariance in absolute terms when evaluated at
In the following numerical example, both under-hedging and over-hedging can be optimal under assumption M for dierent joint probability distributions ofP 1 and theγ i s. The example is based on the following assumptions. There is only one alternative grade (say grade x) of the commodity whose spot price at t = 1 is given byP x =P 1 (1 +γ). In each scenario, the marginal probability distribution ofP 1 has a three-point support: P 1 = 50 with probability 40%, P 1 = 50 − δ with probability 30% and P 1 = 50 + δ with probability 30%. Thus,P 1 is symmetrically distributed such that E[P 1 ] = 50 and var(P 1 ) = 0.6 δ 2 . The marginal probability distribution ofγ has a two-point support: γ = −0.2 and γ = 0.2 with equal probability. In addition, E[γ] = 0, E[min(0, γ)] = −0.1, and var(γ) = 0.04. There are six possible states in the joint probability distribution ofP 1 andγ. Due to the independence ofP 1 andγ, four of the states occur with probability 15% each, and the remaining two occur with probability 20% each. In all states, P x is either 20% higher or 20% lower than P 1 . Hence,P x is not symmetrically distributed. These assumptions are summarized in Table 1 . Furthermore, Table 2 presents the optimal decisions for eleven scenarios that dier in the value of δ, the spread parameter forP 1 . For each scenario, the joint probability distribution is characterized by standard deviations and correlation coecients. Then, the decisions are presented for a power utility function ofÛ(Π) = −1 / Π such that relative risk aversion is equal to two and relative prudence is equal to three.
The rst ve columns of Table 2 exhibit the assumptions on δ and some characteristics of the joint probability distribution ofP 1 andP x . Column 1 gives the value of δ. For example, δ = 20 means that P 1 is either 30, 50 or 70. Both the volatility ofP 1 andP x increase in δ as columns 2 and 3 show. Columns 4 and 5 show the correlation coecients ρ(·) forP 1 andP x and forP 1 and min(P 1 ,P x ). Both correlation coecients are high, indicating that delivery risk is rather small in this example. The coecients increase in δ because an increase in δ causes the covariances to grow at a higher rate than the products of the standard deviations.
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Columns 6 and 7 exhibit the optimal production and hedging decisions for constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) of two. Column 6 shows the optimal production decision. Optimal output slightly decreases in the volatility of the output price.
25
This indicates that even signicant changes in the volatility of tradableP 1 -risk only have a minor impact on optimal output if there is delivery risk. , is given in column 8.
27 Table 2 shows that the variance minimizing 24 Due to the independence ofP 1 andγ, we have cov(P 1 ,P x ) = var(P 1 ). 25 Therefore, the incorrectness made when presenting absolute dierences in columns 7 and 8 instead of hedge ratios is negligible. 26 In the absence of delivery risk, there is no impact at all because full hedging, Q * = H * , is optimal in an unbiased futures market. 27 Of course, the combination of H mv and Q * cannot be optimal if the rm is allowed to optimize over both Q and H, because the optimal values of a rm that minimizes the variance of prots is H = Q = 0.
futures position monotonically increases in δ. In particular, it is an under-hedging position for values of δ ranging from 20 to 22, but turns into an over-hedging position for higher values of δ.
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In order to see why, notice that the variance of the rm's prot is given by
Hence, for given Q, the variance minimizing futures position
The curly bracketed term in the rst line of (12) Since the rm's preferences exhibit prudence, it does not only want to reduce the variability of its prot but it also wants to protect itself from very low realizations of prot (precautionary motive). The only way to satisfy the latter aim is to sell less futures than H mv for the following reason: The lowest realizations of prot occurs when the delivery 28 At δ ≈ 22.82, full hedging is variance minimizing. 29 For the case of two deliverable grades whose prices are jointly lognormally distributed with equal variance, Kamara and Siegel (1987) derive a related result where the variance minimizing hedge ratio may be above or below one. option expires worthless, that is when P x > P 1 due to γ > 0 and grade 1 is the cheapest to deliver.
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In these states, the rm's prot only depends on the realization ofP 1 . Generating additional prot for states with high P 1 requires selling less futures contracts. Starting from the variance minimizing position and taking the precautionary motive into account, it is optimal for a prudent rm to sell less futures contracts than H Due to the quality option, the futures price on the delivery day does not converge to the spot price of the par-delivery grade but to the spot price of the cheapest-to- 30 Of course, this holds for H > 0 only because the delivery option can be exercised by the seller of a futures contract. However, Proposition 3 states that H * is always positive under assumption M. 31 Under quadratic utility, the optimal and the variance minimizing futures position coincide in an unbiased futures market. 32 This can be easily seen from the condition for the variance minimizing futures position under assumption A which is (H mv − Q) var(P 1 ) + H mv var(min(0,ε 2 ,ε 3 , ...,ε n )) = 0.
deliver grade of the commodity. Hence, any futures position carries an additional delivery risk in addition to commodity price risk. Hedgers seeking to manage their commodity price risk are faced with this untradable delivery risk.
This paper examined the optimal production and futures hedging decisions for a risk-averse competitive rm in the presence of delivery risk arising from a quality option. The three main results can be summarized as follows: First, if the rm attaches a higher value to the delivery option than the market does, the existence of the delivery option induces the rm to produce more than in the absence of a delivery option. The second and third result relate to optimal risk management. If the delivery risk is additively related to commodity price risk, the rm will always under-hedge the exposure created by its production decision. This result changes signicantly if the delivery risk is multiplicatively related to commodity price risk such that the deviations between the par-grade and the cheapest-to-deliver grade increase in the level of the par-grade spot price at delivery. In this case, the rm's optimal futures position may also be an over-hedge of its exposure. The reason for the optimality of over-hedging in the presence of untradable delivery risk is the fact that under this specication, the variance minimizing futures position is not necessary a full hedge but may itself be an over-hedge. A numerical example shows how the variance minimizing hedge ratio and the hedge ratio optimal for constant relative risk aversion vary with the amount of delivery risk relative to the price risk associated with a futures contract.
